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Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing
the People's Republic of China
by Hungdah Chiu*
In this work the author assumes normalization as an established
national policy of the United States, and analyzes practical considera-
tions and legal problems relating to the implementation of the
American normalization policy with the People's Republic of China.
In particular, the author addresses questions relating to the current
status of the 1972 Shanghai Communiqug, the legal aspects of a
treaty termination with the Republic of China, the problem of frozen
assets, the international legal status of Taiwan, and the international
status of the Republic of China as affected by the recognition of the
People's Republic of China.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE SMALL NUMBER of published studies on legal aspects of
normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China
(PRC) deal primarily with the United States domestic legal problems
concerning normalization. These works focus on the means for working
out a legal framework in which to maintain existing United States
cultural, economic, trade and other relations with the Republic of
China (ROC) in Taiwan after normalization.' This article does not
deal with such problems, but rather concentrates on five issues of
United States constitutional law and public international law, namely:
1. The Shanghai Communiqu6, which is the basis of United
States-PRC relations. Its legal status will be examined as well as
the related question of whether the document commits the
United States to accept the PRC's three conditions for normaliz-
ing relations.
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. The author would
like to thank Phyllis Dobin Maurer of Swift & Swift, Washington, D.C. for her
research assistance with this article. The views expressed herein are entirely the
author's.
See, e.g., V. Li, DE-RECOGNIZING TAIWAN: THE LEGAL PROBLEMS (1977);
Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China: Practical Implica-
tions: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House
Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 96-100 (1977) (statement of
Eugene A. Theroux).
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2. Domestic and international legal aspects of terminating treaties
with the ROC, especially the Mutual Defense Treaty, concluded
in 1954, and the security problems of Taiwan in the post-
normalization period.
3. The constitutional problem of using frozen PRC assets in the
United States to satisfy the claims of United States nationals
against the PRC.
4. The international legal status of Taiwan.
5. The impact of recognizing the PRC on the international status
of the ROC.
II. THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE:, ITS LEGAL STATUS, AND THE
PRC'S THREE CONDITIONS FOR ESTABLISHING
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
On February 27, 1972, when President Nixon concluded his visit to
the PRC, a joint communiqu6 was issued at Shanghai in which both
countries, while still disagreeing on many issues, stated that "progress
toward the normalization of relations between China and the United
States is in the interests of all countries." 2 Subsequently, some China
specialists in the United States argued for the speedy normalization of
relations with the PRC under the latter's three "conditions," namely
the removal of all United States military personnel and installations
from Taiwan, the severence of the United States diplomatic relations
with the ROC, and the abrogation of the United States-ROC Mutual
Defense Treaty of 1954.3
Some specialists have even argued that in the Shanghai Com-
muniquL the United States had already pledged to take these steps,
2 For the entire text of the Shanghai Communique, see 66 DEPT STATE BULL.
435 (1972).
1 Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Republic of China, Dec. 2, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178 [hereinafter cited
as Mutual Defense Treaty]. The Mutual Defense Treaty was ratified by the United
States Senate on February 9, 1955. 101 CONG. REC. 1379 (1954). The Treaty entered
into force on March 3, 1955.
The three "conditions" were never explicitly articulated as such in any official
statement from Peking, however, a general consensus emerged that the Shanghai Com-
muniqu6 represented an understanding by both Peking and Washington that Peking
sought compliance with these conditions as prerequisites for normalization. Since 1972,
both parties consistently referred to them, although the United States never publicly
embraced the requirements of de-recognition of the ROC and abrogation of the
Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 until President Carter's normalization announcement
of December 15, 1978.
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although the validity of such an interpretation of the Communiqu6
appears to be questionable.
So far as relations between the ROC and the United States are
concerned, the Shanghai Communique was a document of both clari-
ty and ambiguity. It was clear because the PRC and the United States
both maintained that all United States forces should ultimately be
withdrawn from Taiwan. It was ambiguous because the two sides did
not agree on how the Taiwan question should be settled. The PRC in-
sisted that the "liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which
no other country has the right to interfere." On the other hand, the
United States "affirm[ed] its interest in a peaceful settlement of the
Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves." Both statements are
silent as to the United States-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty and United
States-ROC diplomatic relations.
President Nixon explained the United States position before he
went to the PRC in the following terms: "In my address announcing
my trip to Peking, and since then, I have emphasized that our new
dialogue with the PRC would not be at the expense of friends . . .
with the Republic of China, we shall maintain our friendship, our
diplomatic ties, and our defense commitment." 4 This position was af-
firmed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at a press conference held
on February 27, 1972, after the issuance of the Shanghai Communi-
que. The pertinent colloquy is as follows:
Question. Why did not the United States government reaffirm its
treaty commitment to Taiwan, as the President and you have done
on numerous occasions?
Dr. Kissinger. Let me . ..state in response to this and any related
question, and let me do it once and not repeat it. We stated our
basic position with respect to this issue in the President's world report
in which we say that this treaty will be maintained. Nothing has
changed in that position ... the position of the world report stands
and has been unaltered.'
After the issuance of the Shanghai Communique, the United States
gave fifty to sixty assurances to the ROC government that the treaty
commitment would be kept, justifying the conclusion that the United
' U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, The Emerging Structure of Peace, A
Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon (Feb. 9, 1972), reprinted in 66 DEPT STATE
BULL. 330 (1972).
1 President Nixon's Visit to the PRC, News Conference of Dr. Kissinger and Mr.
Green, in Shanghai (Feb. 27, 1972), reprinted in 66 DEPT STATE BULL. 428 (1972).
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States made no commitment in the Shanghai Communiqu6 to ter-
minate diplomatic relations and the Mutual Defense Treaty with
Taiwan.
Some commentators have argued, however, that there was a tacit,
implicit pledge in the Shanghai Communiqu6 or by President Nixon
or Secretary of State Kissinger, to accept the three conditions. This
raises two important questions: (1) Did the United States Government
clearly explain this implication to the American people and American
allies?; (2) Did the United States President or the Secretary of State
have the constitutional authority to commit the United States to such a
secret agreement? In other words, would such an agreement be bind-
ing? My view is that it would not be. 6
In this connection, it is necessary to analyze the legal status of the
Shanghai Communiqu6 in international law. Some commentators
have assumed that it is a treaty or international agreement concluded
between the United States and the PRC. This view is questionable. It
is true that the PRC appears to regard this document as a treaty by in-
cluding it in its official Treaty Series, 7 but the United States has not
yet treated this document as such. The Communiqu6 has not been
included in the Department of State annual official publication,
Treaties in Force, which includes all United States concluded treaties,
agreements, exchange of notes, and others; nor is the Communique
included in the Treaties and International Agreements Series
(T.I.A.S.) of the United States.
At the international level, while international law does not
prescribe a particular form for treaties or international agreements, 8 it
is also true that not every document issued jointly by two countries is
6 In 1975, The United States Department of State publicly declared that any ex-
plicit commitment made by the President toward a foreign country has no legally bind-
ing force. The Department indicated that it does not keep records of exactly how
many commitments are made by American Presidents or of their terms. See Baltimore
Sun, July 3, 1975, at A2. If an explicit commitment made by a President alone is not
legally binding, how can a secret declaration of intention or agreement made by a
President have any political or legal meaning in the eyes of the American people?
1 13 CHUG-HUA JEN-MIN KUNG-HO KUO T'AIO-YO'EH CHI 20-24 (1977) (collection of
treaties of the People's Republic of China). However, neither the United States nor the
PRC has so far attempted to register the Communiqu6 with the United Nations
Secretariat for publication in the United Nations Treaty Series.
8 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875
(1969); 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 679 (1969). See also H. CHIU, THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF TREATIES 14-15 (1972).
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necessarily an international agreement. In the renowned Lauterpacht-
Oppenheim work it is said:
A mere general statement of policy and principles cannot be regarded
as intended to give rise to a contractual obligation in the strict sense
of the word. On the other hand, official statements in the form of
Reports of Conferences signed by the Heads of States or Governments
and embodying agreements reached therein may in proportion as
these agreements incorporate definite rules of conduct, be regarded
as legally binding upon the States in question. 9
If we apply the principles stated above, it is clear that only those
parts of the Communiqu6 where there was agreement between the
United States and the PRC are legally binding in international law.
Those agreed parts, however, did not include the obligation for the
United States to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty or to sever
diplomatic relations with the PRC.10
III. THE PROBLEM OF TERMINATING TREATIES WITH THE ROC AND
THE SECURITY OF TAIWAN IN THE POST-NORMALIZATION PERIOD
One of the PRC's three conditions for normalization was that the
United States abrogate the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC.
Under international law, there were three possible ways for the United
States to terminate the treaty. The first is by invoking article X of the
treaty, which provides that, "[e]ither Party may terminate it one year
after notice has been given to the other Party." While it is .legal for the
United States to invoke article X, this method of termination entails
severe political problems. During the one year notice period, the Presi-
dent would be subjected to extraordinary political pressures to revoke
the notice of termination, as ROC supporters in the United States
would mobilize all their efforts toward reversing the decision. Such an
extended period of political turmoil could seriously impede the whole
of United States foreign policy decision-making and would doubtless
have unforeseeable adverse implications in other spheres of political
and diplomatic action. There also is a constitutional problem as to
1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 873 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955).
'o For a similar view, see Edwards, Legal Aspects of Normalization of U.S. -PRC
Relations, 2 CONTEMP. CHINA 42 (1978). Also, nothing in President Nixon's memoirs
indicates that he ever committed the United States to sever diplomatic relations or to
terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC. See R. NIXON, THE MEMOIRS OF
RIcHAPRD NIXON 559-71 (1978), for an account of the process in negotiating the
Shanghai Communique.
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whether the President can terminate any treaty in this way without the
advice and consent of the Senate, or the participation of the Congress.
Secondly, if Taiwan declared itself a new, sovereign and indepen-
dent state, the Mutual Defense Treaty would automatically lapse
because of the demise of the international personality of the ROC.
The international law principle on this point seems quite clear, as
stated in Lauterpacht-Oppenheim's treatise, "[t]reaties of alliance . . .
or of any other political nature fall to the ground with the extinction
of the State which concludes them."" Under such circumstances, there
would be less public resistance to the President's allowing the Defense
Treaty to lapse. A Gallup Poll conducted August 5 to 15, 1977, a few
days before Secretary of State Vance's trip to the PRC, indicated that
fifty-eight percent of Americans felt that the United States should not
cancel the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC.12 However, in the
same year, an opinion poll conducted by the Foreign Policy Associa-
tion indicated that if Taiwan became an independent new state, sixty-
three percent polled would favor allowing the Mutual Defense Treaty
to lapse, while only eighteen percent would oppose.' 3
A third method of terminating the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty
would be to consider that the treaty lapsed automatically upon
recognition of the PRC as the sole legal government of China. This
method reportedly received favorable consideration from the present
Administration. The theoretical basis of this approach is that since the
ROC and the PRC have each claimed to be the sole legal government
of China, the United States must choose between the two. By recogniz-
ing the PRC as the only legal government of China, the United States
would necessarily de-recognize the ROC and deny that it has any inter-
national legal personality, including the capacity to maintain existing
treaties.
This theory would make sense only if the United States Govern-
ment had in fact and in law treated the ROC government as the only
legal government in China since 1949. But this was not the case. In
the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, it was clearly provided in article VI
that "the terms 'territorial' and 'territories' shall mean in respect of the
Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores," thus limiting United
States recognition of the ROC government to the area under the
i 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 9, at 159.
12 See Gallup Poll: Americans Favor Official Ties with Taipei by 6 to 1, News
From China, Sept. 2, 1977, at 77-78.
13 See FOREIGN POLICY AssOCIATION, OUTREACHER (June 1977).
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latter's effective control. In a joint comminiqu6 issued by the late
President Chiang K'ai-shek and the late Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles on October 23, 1958, it was further provided that the "United
States recognizes that the Republic of China is the authentic
spokesman for Free China.' 4 This made it clear that the United States
did not consider the ROC as representing mainland China under PRC
control. It appears that the latest statement by a high official touching
upon this problem was made in 1961. In response to a question asked
by a representative of the British Broadcasting Corporation on March
3, 1961, then Secretary of State Rusk said, "the Chinese Nationalist
leadership from the mainland, not just Government officials but their
professors, their scholars, their scientists, their artists that came over: to
Taiwan, were to us and are much more genuine representatives of the
China that we have known." After saying this, Dean Rusk immediately
qualified his remarks by saying, "I'm talking in this context about the
great cultural heritage of China,"' thus excluding its implication for
recognizing the ROC as representing all of China.
Actually, since the mid-1950's the United States in fact, and to a
certain extent, in law, treated the two Chinese governments as having
separate personalities in international affairs. This was evidenced by
United States sponsorship of a dual representation proposal at the
United Nations in 1971,16 the maintenance of official relations with the
PRC on a de facto ambassadorial level (a liaison office having
diplomatic immunities),' 7 the restriction of treaties concluded between
the United States and the ROC before 1949 to apply only to Taiwan,' 8
the conclusion of many treaties or agreements with the ROC to apply
to Taiwan only, and numerous other examples. Under such cir-
cumstances, for the United States to terminate the Mutual Defense
Treaty with the ROC by recognizing the PRC as the only legal govern-
ment of China would be inconsistent not only with the political reality
of East Asia, but also with recognized principles of public international
law. The ROC possesses the four essential elements of statehood under
international law, namely: (1) a defined territory; (2) a permanent
population; (3) a government; and (4) the capacity to enter into inter-
14 A full text of the joint communique is set forth in AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY, CURRENT DOCUMENTS, 1958, at 1184-85 (1962) (emphasis added).
15 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, CURRENT DOCUMENTS, 1961, at 946 (1963).
I' U.N. Doc. A/L.633 (Sept. 29, 1971).
' Act of Apr. 20, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-22, 87 Stat. 24.
IS See note 21 infra.
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national relations. None of these elements has changed since the con-
clusion of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954. To say that a country
can evade its treaty obligations by declaring nonrecognition of the
other contracting party would be contrary to a fundamental principle
of international law, pacta sunt servanda. Moreover, international
practice also will not support such a view, as Dr. Bot pointed out:
A non-recognized state can be a party to international agreements
provided that its de facto authorities carry on, even if only as agents,
the external relations and can avail themselves of the resources of the
territory and control the population if necessary, for the purpose of
observing treaty obligations assumed.' 9
The constitutional aspect of terminating the United States-ROC
Mutual Defense Treaty and other treaties concluded with the advice
and consent of the Senate also should be noted. In an elaborate study
of this problem, Senator Goldwater concluded that the executive can-
not terminate the defense treaty with the ROC without the participa-
tion of the Senate or the Congress, either by way of one year notice or
de-recognition.2 0
Moreover, it should be noted that terminating the Mutual Defense
Treaty by de-recognizing the ROC also would result in terminating all
other United States treaties with the ROC. This would include the
1946 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the ROC,
ratified with the advice and consent of the Senate,2 1 which is the very
basis of United States-ROC economic and trade relations. Since most
provisions of this treaty, like other treaties of establishment, are self-
executing, and since most provisions significantly affect the right of
United States nationals and corporations in Taiwan, it is only logical
that the termination of this treaty should require the participation of
the Senate or the Congress.
In this connection, it is interesting to note a memorandum
19 B. BOT, NONRECOGNITION AND TREATY RELATIONS 33 (1968).
20 According to Senator Goldwater, the constitutional power to terminate treaties
lies not with the executive alone, but with the legislature and executive acting in con-
cert. See remarks of Senator Goldwater, 124 CONG. REc. S1I,716 (daily ed. July 25,
1978); 124 CONG. REc. S14,427 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1977); N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1978,
at A2, col. 3; id., at A9, col. 1.
21 63 Stat. 1299; T.I.A.S. No. 1871; 25 U.N.T.S. 69. The Department of State
considers the provisions of this treaty presently superceded with respect to areas of
China not under the control of the National Government of the ROC. U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 52 (1973). However, subsequent issues of the volume omit
this note; it is not clear whether the treaty is now applicable to mainland China.
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prepared by the Office of the Legal Advisor of the State Department,
dated February 10, 1958, which states:
The United States Constitution is silent with respect to the power to
terminate treaties ....
Although it is conceded that it is an executive function to com-
municate with foreign states on such matters . . . it has been ques-
tioned whether this function can be exercised for the purpose of
terminating a treaty without the sanction of either or both of the
Houses of the Congress ...
In connection with the termination or denunciation of a par-
ticular treaty by the United States, e.g., one year notice of termina-
tion, matters of policy or special circumstances may make it appear
to be advisable or necessary to obtain the concurrence or support of
the Congress or the Senate, either before or after taking the action
for termination or denunciation .... 22
In view of the above discussion, it appears that whether the ex-
ecutive can unilaterally terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty or any
other ratified treaty with the ROC without the participation of the
Congress or the Senate, is at least an open question. At a minimum, it
seems unlikely that a treaty, ratified by a two-thirds vote of the Senate,
could lawfully be abrogated simply by executive order. This is especial-
ly so given the current political climate, in which the Congress appears
anxious to retain and employ fully foreign policy powers.
In September 1978, the Congress attached an amendment to the
International Security Assistance Act of 1978 concerning the Mutual
Defense Treaty with the ROC. The text is as follows:
(a) The Congress finds that-
(1) the continued security and stability of East Asia is a matter of
major strategic interest to the United States;
(2) the United States and the Republic of China have for a period of
twenty-four years been linked together by the Mutual Defense Treaty
of 1954;
(3) the Republic of China has during that twenty-four-year period
faithfully and continually carried out its duties and obligations under
that treaty; and
(4) it is the responsibility of the Senate to give its advice and consent
to treaties entered into by the United States.
(b) It is the sense of the Congress that there should be prior consulta-
22 14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 461 (1970).
1979
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
tion between the Congress and the executive branch on any proposed
policy changes affecting the continuation in force of the Mutual
Defense Treaty of 1954.23
President Carter, however, ignoring the "sense" of the Congress
and giving congressional leaders only a few hours advance notice,
dramatically announced on December 15, 1978, that he would
establish diplomatic relations with the PRC on January 1, 1979.24 A
separate statement announced that the United States would terminate
diplomatic relations with the ROC on that date and notify the ROC
that the Mutual Defense Treaty would be terminated on January 1,
1980, in accordance with article X of the treaty. 25 The President's
unilateral decision without any prior consultations with the Senate ap-
parently provoked many senators to challenge his move. Inside the
Senate, it was reported that some senators proposed a resolution to re-
quire Senate approval for termination of a treaty. 26 Outside the
Senate, six senators and eight congressmen, headed by Senator
Goldwater, filed a suit on December 22, 1978, in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the constitu-
tionality of President Carter's unilateral decision to terminate the
United States-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty.2 7
A question closely related to the termination of the Mutual Defense
Treaty is the security of Taiwan after the termination of the treaty on
January 1, 1980. It had been the position of previous administrations
that the PRC should pledge not to use force against Taiwan in ex-
change for United States termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty
with the ROC. In connection with its recognition on January 1, 1979,
the PRC neither explicitly nor implicitly pledged to refrain from using
25 Pub. L. No. 95-384, § 26, 88 Stat. 746 (1978) (amending 22 U.S.C.A. §
2151). The amendment was originally adopted by the Senate by a vote of 94 to 0. 138
CONG. REc. S11,713 (daily ed. July 25, 1978).
24 Joint Communiqu6 on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between
the United States of America and the People's Republic of China-January 1, 1979, 14
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. (Dec. 18, 1978), reprinted in 11 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L
L. 227 (1979).
21 Memorandum of December 30, 1978, Fed. Reg. 1075 (1979); N.Y. Times,
Dec. 18, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
26 See Weaver, Treaty Termination May Spur Senators, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18,
1978, at A13, col. 3.
27 Goldwater v. Carter, No. 78-2412 (D.D.C., filed Dec. 22, 1978). The suit was
dismissed for lack of standing on June 6, 1979. Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 7, 1979,
at A28, col. 3.
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force against Taiwan. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs Holbroke acknowledged that the United States
negotiators had made no attempt to request Peking to do so. 28 The
United States also refrained from making a separate statement to com-
mit United States assistance to Taiwan against outside attack.
In President Carter's statement accompanying the announcement
of the joint communiquE establishing diplomatic relations between
the PRC and the United States, he merely made the following state-
ment concerning Taiwan: "The United States is confident that the
people of Taiwan face a peaceful and prosperous future. The United
States continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the
Taiwan issue and expect that the Taiwan issue will be settled peaceful-
ly by the Chinese themselves." 29 The PRC immediately responded in a
separate statement issued on the same day, by saying that the decision
as to how to bring Taiwan back under its control for purposes of "uni-
fying the country" was the PRC's "internal affair," implying that force
could be used.
On the United States arms sales to Taiwan in the post-
normalization period, the United States and the PRC only reached an
agreement to disagree. PRC Premier Hua Kuo-feng said at a press
conference held on December 16, 1978:
During the negotiations the United States side mentioned that after
normalization it would continue to sell a limited amount of arms to
Taiwan for defensive purposes. We made it clear that we absolutely
would not agree to this. In all discussions the Chinese side repeatedly
made clear its position on this question. We held that after the nor-
malization, continued sales of arms to Taiwan by the United States
would not conform to the principles of the normalization, would be
detrimental to the peaceful liberation of Taiwan, and would exercise
an unfavourable influence on the peace and stability of the Asia-
Pacific region. So our two sides had difference on this point. Never-
theless, we reached an agreement on the joint communiqu. 30
Later, it was disclosed that the United States agreed to sell only
"limited" defensive weapons to Taiwan after normalization and to sell
no arms to Taiwan in 1979.31 Many members of Congress severely
criticized this agreement because there was no credible security
28 See Gorddry, U.S. Conflict on Taiwan's Safety, Plans Company to Handle In-
terests, Baltimore Sun, Dec. 19, 1978, at A2.
29 Memorandum of December 30, 1978, 44 Fed. Reg. 1075 (1979).
" Chairman Hua Gives Press Conference, PEKING REv., Dec. 22, 1978, at A2.
31 N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1979, at 3.
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assurance for Taiwan. After prolonged discussion in Congress and
negotiation between congressional leaders and the Carter Administra-
tion, the latter reluctantly agreed to include the following policy state-
ment on Taiwan's security in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, passed
by the House (March 26, 1979) and the Senate (March 29, 1979):
(b) It is the policy of the United States-
(1) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly com-
mercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the
United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the
China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area;
(2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the
political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and
are matters of international concern;
(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon
the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by
peaceful means;
(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by
other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a
threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of
grave concern to the United States;
(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any
resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the
security, or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan.3 '
IV. THE PROBLEM OF UNITED STATES NATIONALS' CLAIMS
AGAINST THE PRC
At present, there are 384 United States claims worth approximately
$196.8 million, without interest, against the PRC which have been
validated by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. s On the
other hand, it has been reported that about $80 million in PRC assets
in this country were "frozen" during the Korean War. It has been sug-
gested that these 384 claims could be settled along the lines suggested
by the model of the 1933 Litvinov Assignment 4 between the United
'2 Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-8, § 2(b), 93 Stat. 14 (1979)
(to be codified in 22 U.S.C. § 3301).
" See Redick, The Jurisdiction of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission:
Chinese Claims, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 728 (1973).
s, Exchange of Notes at Washington, Nov. 16, 1933, between the President of
the United States and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR,
reprinted in 11 C. BEVANS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1776-1949, at 1256-58 (1968).
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States and the Soviet Union, under which the Soviet Union agreed to
settle certain claims by the assignment to the United States of assets
due to the Soviet Union as the successor of prior governments of
Russia."9 However, whether the Chinese claims could be settled and
ultimately effectuated within the framework of the United States Con-
stitution is a question which has not yet been adequately studied in the
voluminous literature on the normalization problem.
The alleged PRC assets in this country consist primarily of bank
deposits or properties owned by Chinese nationals who resided on the
mainland or by private corporations which were located there. Except
the for PRC liaison office building and the PRC's United Nations mis-
sion building, both of which are immune from United States jurisdic-
tion under Public Law 93-2236 and the International Organization Im-
munities Act,"3 there are no PRC government assets in this country. In
this connection, one must also take into consideration the particular
situation of China-the ROC government continues to exist in Taiwan
and continues legally to own all the government assets acquired in the
name of China before the ROC's removal to Taiwan in 1949. Even
after United States de-recognition of the ROC and recognition of the
PRC on January 1, 1979, the situation remains the same as it is ex-
plicitly provided for in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, that
"recognition of the People's Republic of China shall not affect in any
way the ownership of or other rights or interests in properties, tangible
and intangible, and other things of value, owned or held on or prior to
December 31, 1978, or thereafter acquired or earned by the governing
authorities in Taiwan." 38 Hence, the Chinese situation is not similar to
the Russian case, because at the time of the Litvinov Assignment the
Soviet government was the sole de facto government of the State of
Russia.
In order to transfer the alleged PRC assets in the United States, it
would be necessary for the PRC to confiscate all its nationals' bank
deposits or properties located in the United States and for the United
States to recognize the extraterritorial effect of the PRC's confiscatory
decree. In United States v. Pink,3 9 the Supreme Court held that the
86 See Pavelic, Exporting to the People's Republic of China, 11 CASE W. REs. J.
INT'L L. 337 (1979).
36 Act of Apr. 20, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-22, 87 Stat. 24.
3' Act of Dec. 29, 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-291, 59 Stat. 669.
-1 Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-8, § 4(B), 93 Stat. 14 (1979)
(to be codified in 22 U.S.C. § 3303).
- 3151U.S. 203 (1942).
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Soviet nationalization decrees were intended to embrace property in
the United States and that United States recognition of the Soviet
government validated all acts of the recognized government from the
commencement of its existence. The Court also held that the public
policy of New York denying effect to confiscatory decrees was over-
riden by the international compact involved, viz., the Litvinov Assign-
ment. If the principle of that case remains valid today, it has been
suggested that the claims against the PRC could certainly be settled
along the lines of the Litvinov Assignment. 40
However, the Pink case has been severely criticized. The main ob-
jection to the case is that aliens' private property in this country is
under the protection of the Fifth Amendment, but the Pink case ap-
pears to suggest that the President can resort to an executive agree-
ment, without the participation of the Congress, to confiscate aliens'
private property in the United States. 41
Because of the questionable ruling of the Pink case and indeed,
because of the doubts as to its applicability, one can hardly assume
that its ruling would be applied to the Chinese claims situation. In any
case, to get a better basis for using bank deposits or properties located
in the United States owned by residents in mainland China, it appears
that the President should enlist the support of the Congress in han-
dling the matter. A problem with referring the matter to the Congress,
however, is created by the Gravel Amendment to the Trade Reform
Act of 1974.42
The Gravel Amendment effectively blocked a United States-
Czechoslovakia lump sum agreement of July 5, 1974, which sought to
settle the claims of United States nationals arising from
Czechoslovakia's post-war nationalization program. The amount of the
compensation payable by Czechoslovakia under the agreement was
roughly twenty percent of the United States nationals' claim against
Czechoslovakia. Congress considered the amount of compensation un-
satisfactory and, under the authority of the Gravel Amendment,
directed the President to renegotiate the issue. As a result, Congress
did not grant most favored nation status to Czechoslovakia. 43
40 See, e.g., Redick, supra note 33, at 740.
41 Borchard, Extraterritorial Confiscations, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 280 (1942);
Jessup, The Litvinov Assignment and the Pink Case, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 282-88 (1942);
Stevenson, United States v. Pink-A Reappraisal, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 890 (1948);
Note, Effect of Soviet Recognition upon Russian Confiscatory Decrees, 51 YALE L.J.
848 (1941-42).
42 19 U.S.C. § 2438 (1976).
4' See Lillich, The Gravel Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974: Con-
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While the Gravel Amendment legally affects only the
Czechoslovakia claim settlement and its most favored nation status, it
has ramifications as a precedent for the China claims situation. The
only way to achieve a claim settlement with the PRC without requiring
actual cash payment by the latter to the United States is to provide an
approximately forty percent return to United States claimants (frozen
PRC assets of about $80 million in the United States compared with
about $200 million in United States nationals' claims against the
PRC).4 4 Congress might find the compensation inadequate and refuse
to approve such a claim settlement agreement.
One way to bypass the Congress is to use a Litvinov-type executive
agreement to settle the United States nationals' claim against the
PRC. 45 This approach, however, might provoke Congress to take
retaliatory actions in other legislation relating to United States-PRC
relations, such as granting of most favored nation treatment to the
PRC. Many Senators and Representatives already have expressed their
displeasure at the President's unilateral action to terminate diplomatic
relations and the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC. It would be
very unwise for the President to take additional unilateral action on
the claims settlement problem.
Finally, it is not clear whether the PRC has so far issued a decree
to confiscate or nationalize all its nationals' properties abroad. If no
such decree has been issued, it is unlikely that the PRC would take
measures now in order to satisfy claims of United States nationals.
Recently, the PRC has reversed its previous policy of hostility toward
overseas Chinese, and the new Chinese Constitution of 1978 explicitly
provides in article 54 that, "[t]he state protects the just rights and in-
terests of overseas Chinese and their relatives."46 Under such cir-
gress Checkmates a Presidential Lump Sum Agreement, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 837, 839
(1975).
'4 The only cash compensation agreement signed by the PRC was with Canada
for certain ship loans. See Exchange of Notes Betweenthe Government of Canada and
the Government of the People's Republic of China Settling and Terminating the Loans
Contracted by the Ming Sung Industrial Co., Ltd., from the Canadian Banks on
Oct. 30, 1946, done June 4, 1973, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 870 (1974).
4' See Devane, The United States and China: Claims and Assets, 18 ASIAN
SURVEY 1267 (1978); Bayer, The Blocked Chinese Assets: Present Status and Future
Disposition, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 959, 1002-06 (1975). For a discussion of the Chinese
claims problem, see Lee, The United States and the People's Republic of China: The
Blocked Assets-Claims Problem, 8 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 253 (1975); Comment, Ex-
propriated Property, Frozen Assets, and Sovereign Immunity: Legal Obstacles to
United States-China Trade Relations, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 254 (1976).
46 PEKING RFxv.. Mar. 11, 1979, at 14 (emphasis added).
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cumstances, if the PRC decided to nationalize the properties located in
this country but owned by its nationals, many of whom have friends
and relatives abroad, in order to satisfy the American claimants, its ac-
tion would seriously undermine its present policy of wooing overseas
Chinese.
In view of the above stated difficulties in settling the Chinese
claims, the final settlement was quite an ingenious one and did take
into consideration the problems discussed above. According to the
agreement initialled between the United States and the PRC on March
1, 1979, and signed on May 11, 1979, the PRC agreed to pay a total
of eighty-one million dollars for settlement of all United States na-
tionals' claims against it by October 1, 1984. The first installment of
thirty million dollars will be paid on October 1, 1979. In return for
this payment, the United States will unblock the frozen Chinese assets
here, estimated at about eighty million dollars. 47 However, the PRC or
its nationals will probably collect only a small part of the unblocked
assets since banks in other countries have already laid claim to some of
the accounts.4 1 On the other hand, a substantial amount of claims
against the PRC (about thirty percent) involve religious and nonprofit
organizations, such as missionary societies; they seemed to agree to in-
vest most of the proceeds of the claim settlement in furthering educa-
tional or other similar activities in China. With respect to corporate
claims (about sixty percent), companies may have to forego receipt of
the funds in exchange for the right to do business in China.
49
V. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF TAIWAN
One of the crucial legal problems closely related to the United
States recognition of the PRC is the international legal status of
Taiwan. If recognition of the PRC would result in an implied or ex-
plicit recognition of the PRC's claim to the island, then it would not
be legally possible for the United States to aid Taiwan, such as by pro-
viding arms, to resist a PRC takeover of the island in the future.
Therefore, it is essential to evaluate the international legal status of the
island and the PRC's claim to it.
Although Chinese settlement in Taiwan can be traced back to the
sixth century, the Chinese did not set up an administration there until
41 N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1979, at Al; id., May 11, 1979, at Al.
48 Rousmaniere, Firms May Forgo Chinese Payments for Access, Baltimore Sun,
Mar. 4, 1979, at K7.
49 Id.
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1661, when Cheng Ch'eng-kung (Koxinga), a general of the defunct
Ming dynasty (1368-1644) captured the island from the Dutch and set
up a government. General Cheng and later his son, Cheng Ching used
Taiwan as a base to restore the Ming dynasty. In 1683, Cheng's grand-
son surrendered Taiwan to the Ch'ing Empire (1644-1911), which then
administered the island as a part of the mainland's Fukien Province.
Taiwan was made a separate province in 1886. Nine years later, in
1895, after China's defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95),
the island was ceded through the Treaty of Shimonoseki"0 to Japan.
On December 9, 1941, the ROC government, then on the
mainland, issued a formal declaration of war against Japan, and
declared "that all treaties, conventions, agreements, and contracts
regarding relations between China and Japan are and remain null and
void."" At the Cairo Conference in November 1943, President Chiang
Kai-shek, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Prime Minister
Winston Churchill signed a joint communiquE on November 26,
stating, in part, that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the
Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa (Taiwan), and the Pescadores
(Penghu), shall be returned to the Republic of China."5 2 On July 26,
1945, the heads of government of the United States, the Republic of
China, and the United Kingdom declared in the Potsdam Proclama-
tion that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out."5 "
Japan signed the Instrument of Surrender, thereby accepting the provi-
sions of the Potsdam Proclamation, on September 2, 1945.14 On
October 25, the ROC took over Taiwan from the Japanese, and soon
restored it to its status as a province of the ROC. On December 8,
1949, the (Nationalist) government established its provisional capital in
Taipei.
Despite the fact that the ROC began to exercise jurisdiction over
Taiwan from October 25, 1945, the question of sovereignty was not
technically resolved until the early 1950's. In international law and
practice, a transfer of territories between states occurs through a treaty
or by a unilateral renunciation of territorial sovereignty by the
:0 1 Hertslet's China Treaties 362 (1908).
1' Reprinted in CHINA AND THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN: DOCUMENTS AND
ANALYSIS 204 (H. Chiu ed. 1973).
52 3 DEPT STATE BULL. 393 (1943).
5" Reprinted in 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, DIPLOMATIC
PAPER: THE CONFERENCE OF BERLIN (THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE), 1945, at 1474
(1960).
14 For the text of the Instrument of Surrender, see 59 Stat. 1734.
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transferor and the establishment of de facto control by the transferee
over the territory concerned. So far as Taiwan is concerned, this was
not done until the San Francisco peace treaty with Japan, signed on
September 8, 1951.1- The Japanese peace treaty provides in article 2
that "Japan renounces all rights, title and claim to Formosa and the
Pescadores." Because the victorious powers could not agree on which
government of China-the PRC or the ROC-should be invited to
participate in the peace conference, it was decided not to invite either
of them. On the other hand, Japan signed a bilateral peace treaty with
the ROC on April 28, 1952,56 wherein article 2 provides: "It is
recognized that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed
at the City of San Francisco in the United States of America on
September 8, 1951, Japan has renounced all rights, title and claim to
Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores)."
Since neither the San Francisco peace treaty nor the Japan-ROC
peace treaty explicitly provides for the return of Taiwan to China, the
question of the legal status of Taiwan has become a complex and con-
troversial issue. The position, as stated by the late Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles, at a press conference held on December 1, 1954, is
"that technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has never
been settled," and that "the future title is not determined by the
Japanese peace treaty (signed at San Francisco), nor is it determined
by the peace treaty which was concluded between the Republic of
China and Japan." '5 7 Some Western scholars have argued, however,
that the ROC could in fact acquire lawful territorial sovereignty over
Taiwan. For instance, Professor D. P. O'Connell of Australia, a well-
known authority on international law, wrote that after the Japanese
renunciation of the island, it was "doubtful . . .whether there is any
international law doctrine opposed to the conclusion that China
[could] appropriate the terra derelicta (the abandoned land) of For-
mosa by converting the belligerent occupation into definite
sovereignty." 8 Professor O'Connell refers vaguely to China without
specifying whether he means the ROC or the PRC but, because the
PRC has no physical control over Taiwan, it cannot be argued that
11 Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No. 2480,
136 U.N.T.S. 45.
56 Treaty of Peace, Republic of China-Japan, Apr. 28, 1952, 138 U.N.T.S. 38.
5' 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 564 (1970).
6 O'Connell, The Status of Formosa and the Chinese Recognition Problem, 50
AM. J. INT'L L. 405, 415 (1956).
Vol. 11:389
LEGAL ASPECTS OF PRC RECOGNITION
Peking could acquire sovereignty over Taiwan through the theory sug-
gested by Professor O'Connell.
Similarly, Arthur H. Dean, now Honorary President of the
American Society of International Law, also has argued:
Since Japan renounced all right, title and claim to Formosa and the
Pescadores . . .Nationalist China may have already acquired legal
title to Formosa and the Pescadores by occupation or possibly by sub-
jugation . . . .Until the coming into force of the Japanese peace
treaty on April 28, 1952, there was a formal obstacle to Nationalist
China's acquiring legal title to Formosa by occupation, in that
technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores remained in
Japan. There were, accordingly, not terrae nullius capable of being
acquired by occupation. However, when Japan renounced all right,
title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores, this obstacle was
removed. 9
This interpretation of the legal status of Taiwan is confirmed by
several Japanese court decisions. For instance, in Japan v. Lai Chin
Jung, decided by the Tokyo High Court on December 13, 1956, it was
stated that "Formosa and the Pescadores came to belong to the
Republic of China, at any rate on August 5, 1952, when the [peace]
treaty between Japan and the Republic of China came into force."6 0
Now let us turn to the PRC's claim to Taiwan. While the legal
arguments summarized above would support the ROC's claim to
Taiwan, the same arguments would not support the PRC's claim to
Taiwan, for several reasons. In the first place, the PRC has denied the
validity of both of the Japanese peace treaties mentioned above. On
August 15, 1951, before the San Francisco treaty was signed, Premier
Chou En-lai denounced the proposed treaty as "illegal, and therefore
null and void."'e On May 5, 1952, after the treaty entered into force,
Chou again repudiated it as "completely illegal." 2 Peking can hardly
claim any benefit from a document which it considers to be illegal and
void. Moreover, after Japan's renunciation of its claim to Taiwan, the
19 Dean, International Law and Current Problems in the Far East, PROC. AM.
SOCY INT'L L. (1955), cited in 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1230
(1970).
60 Cited in Materials on Succession of States, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER B-14, at
70 (1967).
61 H. CHIU, supra note 8, at 244-45.
62 2 CHUNG-HUA JEN-MIN KUNG-HO KUO TUI-WAI KUAN-HSI WEN-CHIEN-CHI 66
(1951-53) (compilation of documents relative to the foreign relations of the People's
Republic of China).
1979
CASE W. RES. j INT'L L.
PRC could not acquire title over the island through the international
law principle of occupation, because it had no physical control over
the island. Nor could the PRC claim title over Taiwan because it con-
siders the ROC government to be an illegal group or even bandits.
Clearly, a government can no more claim benefits through a regime
which it does not recognize as legal than it can through a document
which it has declared illegal and void.
Some PRC writers have argued that because Taiwan was originally
Chinese territory, a peace treaty is not necessary to transfer title back
to China, especially since the Treaty of Shimonoseki ceding Taiwan to
Japan was abrogated as a result of the outbreak of the Second Sino-
Japanese War in 1937.63 International practice, however, does not sup-
port the PRC position. The provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, for ex-
ample, were originally French territory, but were ceded to Germany in
1871. Subsequently, they were returned to France through the Treaty
of Versailles signed between the Allied and Associated Powers (in-
cluding France) and Germany on June 28, 1919.64 In other words,
French sovereignty over its former territory did not automatically
revert after World War I, but required the formal treaty mechanism.
There does not appear to be any precedent or principle of interna-
tional law supporting the PRC position that on October 25, 1945,
Taiwan was restored to China de jure, and de facto.
If this reasoning is correct, then the PRC's claim must be primarily
based on the theory of historical irredentism. PRC writers and officials
have frequently argued that Taiwan is historically Chinese; and that
during the Japanese occupation (1895-1945), the people of Taiwan
longed for reunification with China. But while this is an undoubted
historical fact, it can hardly support the PRC's claim to Taiwan today.
In the first place, during the period of Japanese occupation, China was
run by a government which permitted a free enterprise economy, and
the society was relatively free. If the people of Taiwan had known at
the time that mainland China would become the totalitarian, highly
regimented society it is today, it is unlikely that they would have longed
so fervently for reunification. The fact that very few people from
Taiwan participated in the Communist movement in China during the
"3 See, e.g., Chin-fu, The Absurd Theory of "Two Chinas" and Principles of
International Law, cited in H. CHIU, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW
OF TREATIES 132 (1972).
64 See article 51 of the Versailles Treaty, reprinted in E. CHILL & F. ISRAEL, MA.
JOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 1311 (1967).
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Japanese occupation period seems to support this point. And today, it
seems abundantly clear that the vast majority of the people on Taiwan
do not want to be united with the PRC.
Second, Mao Tse-tung himself did not include Taiwan among
China's "lost territories" to be regained from Japan. In an interview at
Yenan on July 16, 1936, Mao said that "[i]f the Koreans wish to break
away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend them
our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same
thing applies for Formosa."6
5
Third, the doctrine of self-determination is now an accepted prin-
ciple of international law, and one that has not been opposed by the
PRC. This principle would certainly overrule any historical claim of
the PRC toward Taiwan, since the great majority of the people of
Taiwan now clearly oppose unification with the PRC. Thus, historical
claim alone will not justify a country's claim to a piece of territory.
In the 1972 Shanghai Communique, the United States declared
that "[it] acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan
Strait maintain there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China.
The United States government does not challenge that position."66
Some people have argued that the United States thus accepted the
PRC's claim to Taiwan in the Shanghai Communique. But this is
certainly not true. The phrase "does not challenge" is not equivalent to
a recognition of the PRC claim. This interpretation also was confirmed
by a high official of the United States Government. Soon after the is-
suance of the Shanghai Communique, Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Marshall Green, denied that it
represented any change in the position held by the United States since
1950, namely, that the status of Taiwan was as yet undetermined.67
Moreover, it was disclosed recently that at the time of negotiating the
Shanghai Communique, then Secretary of State Kissinger wanted to
accept the PRC's position on Taiwan by stating in the Communiqu6
that the United States "accepts" rather than "does not challenge" the
belief of "all Chinese in one China." But he was rebuffed in that at-
tempt, possibly by President Nixon.6 8
In the Washington-Peking Joint CommuniquE on the Establish-
ment of Diplomatic Relations issued on December 15, 1978, the
65 E. SNOW, RED STAR O1ER CHINA 96 (1961).
66 66 DEPT STATE BULL. 435 (1972).
67 Mainichi Daily News, Mar. 29, 1972, at 5.
61 Karnow, Our Next Move on China, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1977, (Magazine),
at 34.
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United States "acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one
China and Taiwan is part of China." However, the PRC translated the
word "acknowledges" into "Cheng-jen" in the Chinese version of the
Communiqu6, which retranslated into English means "recognizes.
6 9
The United States did not, apparently due to the ignorance of the
translators, challenge the accuracy of the Chinese version of the Com-
muniqu6. Therefore, the Chinese side could then rely on their version
of the Communiqu6 to claim that the United States had already
"recognized" their territorial claim to Taiwan. Furthermore, in a
separate statement issued on the same day, Peking insisted that the
problem of bringing Taiwan back under its control for "unifying the
Country" was China's "internal affair," as mentioned above. Again,
there was no United States challenge to the Chinese statement.
In view of the above analysis, if the United States does not make its
position on the legal status of Taiwan70 clear, it will be in a poor legal
position to challenge the PRC's interference in United States relations,
commercial, cultural, defensive or otherwise, with Taiwan.
A question closely related to the legal status of Taiwan is the
ROC's claim to the mainland of China. If the ROC continues to make
an unconditional claim to sovereignty over the mainland now controlled
by the PRC, then, despite the special legal status of Taiwan, there will
be no reason to question the PRC for making a similarly unconditional
claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Since its removal to Taiwan,
69 For a reprint of the American text, see 11 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 227
(1979). For the Chinese text, see Jen-min jih pao (People's Daily), Dec. 17, 1978, at 1.
70 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Roger
Sullivan told the Taiwan press on December 27, 1978, that in the Joint Communiqu6
of December 15, 1978, the United States did not recognize the People's Republic of
China's sovereign claim to Taiwan. Chung-yan jih-pao (Central Daily News), Dec. 28,
1978, at 1. However, at that point no public statement on the status of Taiwan had
been made by a high level American official to the American press. Several Senators
also raised this issue. For instance, Senator Glenn, Chairman of the Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said on January 24, 1979, that when
the agreements on normalization were jointly announced, President Carter indicated
that the United States "acknowledges" Peking's claim to Taiwan. In addition, Glenn
pointed out that the Chinese government's parallel statement did not use the word
"acknowledge," and was phrased instead to say that the United States "recognizes"
China's claim to Taiwan. Senator Glenn has criticized the Administration for its failure
to protest the Chinese use of words. He also warned that he will make this issue and
the security of Taiwan his principal focus of interest in any upcoming congressional
hearings regarding the Administration's plans for establishing United States relations
with Taiwan on a nongovernmental basis. See Goshko, Glenn Says China Pledge on
Taiwan is Essential, Wash. Post, Jan. 25, 1979, at 1, col. 3.
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however, the ROC has gradually imposed important limitations on its
claim to the mainland. In the first place, treaties which were formerly
applicable to all of China were explicitly revised to limit their applica-
tion to Taiwan. For instance, the 1946 Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce, and Navigation between the United States and the Republic of
China has not been applicable to mainland China since the early
1950's." Similarly, new treaties or agreements concluded since 1950
have all been limited in their application to the Taiwan area. For ex-
ample, the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States pro-
vides in article VI that, "[f]or the purposes of Articles II and V, the
terms 'territorial' and 'territories' shall mean in respect of the Republic
of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores."
Further, in an exchange of notes accompanying the 1954 Mutual
Defense Treaty, the ROC pledged not to use force against the
mainland without the consent of the United States. And in a joint
communique issued by President Chiang Kai-shek and United States
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on October 23, 1958, the ROC
made a more general pledge not to use force against the mainland. It
states:
The government of the Republic of China considers that the restora-
tion of freedom to its people on the mainland is its sacred mission. It
believes that the foundation of this mission resides in the minds and
the hearts of the Chinese people, and that the principal means of
successfully achieving its mission is the implementation of Dr. Sun
Yat-sen's three peoples' principles (nationalism, democracy, and
social well-being), and not the use of force. 72
This pledge of the nonuse of force to achieve unification was con-
firmed recently by a statement of the ROC Foreign Minister, Shen
Chang-huan, on July 1, 1977, in which he said:
It has been the consistent position of the government of the Republic
of China to carry out its responsibility of delivering our 800 million
compatriots from Communist tyranny by political means, while the
Chinese Communists have never given up, their design to "liberate"
Taiwan by force. The "peaceful settlement" theme being harped on
by the Chinese Communists is but an attempt on their part to impose
their tyrannical rule on the 16 million Chinese on Taiwan.73
"1 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 52 (1973).
72 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, CURRENT DOCUMENTS, 1958, at 1185 (1962).
" The English translation appears in Comments on "Normalization" and MIG-IS
Pilot's Detection, Central Daily News, July 1977, at 23.
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The foregoing analysis seems to establish that the ROC has, in fact,
suspended its claim to the Chinese mainland by renouncing the use of
force to achieve unification. The PRC, however, still insists on its right
to use force to "liberate" Taiwan-a territory to which it does not have
a clear legal title. An attempt to vindicate a claim to territory by the
use of force is prohibited both by international law and by the Charter
of the United Nations.
VI. THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES RECOGNITION OF THE PRC ON
THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE ROC
There is no doubt that United States recognition of the PRC will
have important legal, economic and political impact on the interna-
tional status of the ROC. However, whether United States recognition
of the PRC will have a significant adverse effect on the ROC will de-
pend on:
1. Whether the United States continues to recognize the ROC as a
state within the territory under its control.
2. The pattern of United States-ROC relations in the post-
recognition period.
It could be possible for the United States to recognize the PRC,
while continuing to maintain diplomatic or official (liaison office hav-
ing official legal status) relations, including existing treaty relations,
with the ROC. This would have minimum adverse impact on the
ROC. On the other hand, if United States recognition of the PRC
results in de-recognition of the ROC as a state in the international
community, there will be serious detriment to the ROC.
First, United States termination of diplomatic relations and refusal
to maintain official relations with the ROC could cause the remaining
twenty-one states which have continued to recognize the ROC to follow
suit, thus fundamentally weakening the ROC's international status by
making it a non-state.
By maintaining only unofficial relations with Taiwan in the post-
recognition period, the United States would at least be tacitly recogniz-
ing the PRC's territorial claim to Taiwan. Thus, if the PRC later
chose to interfere with the United States trade, government loan or
guarantee, or arms sales relations with the ROC, the United States
would be in poor position to resist the PRC's interference. The China
Airlines dispute between Japan and Taiwan of 1973 and 1974 is a vivid
example. In that case, the PRC forced Japan to provoke the ROC in ter-
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minate the air service between Taipai and Tokyo by making insulting
remarks against the ROC flag.74
The Carter Administration and certain commentators have argued
that after Japanese recognition of the PRC on the latter's terms, the
volume of trade between Japan and Taiwan continued to grow.
Therefore, in their view, recognition of the PRC at the expense of the
ROC should not have a significant adverse effect on United States
trade and economic relations with the ROC. This view is questionable
for several reasons.
It is true that the volume of Japan-Taiwan trade has continued to
grow since 1972; nevertheless, Taiwan's rate of growth of trade has
been losing ground to the PRC since 1972. In a study on the Japanese
formula for normalizing relations with the PRC, Dr. James W. Morley,
Professor and Chairman of the Department of Government at Colum-
bia University, correctly pointed out that, taking China area trade
(PRC, ROC and Hong Kong) as a whole, the PRC's share of the
Japan-China area trade has grown significantly since 1972. He said:
In contrast to the PRC share of Japan's exports to these markets
which has risen from 23% to 41% in the period from 1972 to 1975,
Taiwan has followed the reverse course, dropping from 42% to 33%
and Hong Kong likewise, from 35% to 25%. Similarly, over the same
period, the PRC share of Japan's imports from these Chinese sources
rose from 48% to 59% while Taiwan's fell from 41% to 31% and
Hong Kong's from 11% to 10%.75
Professor Morley also explained the reasons for such limited growth
of Japan-Taiwan trade relations since 1972:
Since normalization, neither the Japanese Export-Import Bank nor
the Economic Cooperation Fund has extended any aid to Taiwan.
Very little Japanese money, even private, has gone into the 10 large
construction projects on which the ROC counts for economic
growth- projects, for example, for road and railroad building, har-
bor construction, power generation, and heavy and petro-chemical
industrial production. Japanese private entrepreneurs appear to be
limiting their investments in Taiwan to those in which their capital
can be recouped in a short, 2-3 year space of time.76
In addition to the reasons given by Professor Morley, businessmen
74 Morley, The Japanese Formula for Normalization and its Relevance for United
States-China Policy, in 3 OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS IN CONTEMPORARY ASIAN
STUDIES 130-31 (H. Chiu ed. 1978).
15 Id. at 132.
76 Id. at 131.
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in Taiwan indicate that Japanese legal obstacles have increased the dif-
ficulty of doing business with Japan. Among these are delays in obtain-
ing visas (from five days to several weeks), treatment of ROC nationals
in Japan as stateless persons, and the lack of government-to-
government relations which have made bilateral trade agreements im-
possible.
Furthermore, in an era of highly competitive international trade
and in view of the rise of protectionism in many industrial states, trade
relations must be governed by government-to-government agreements
and can hardly be satisfactorily handled by unofficial contracts or
agreements. The ROC's trade difficulties with the European Economic
Community (EEC) are an example. Recently, the EEC planned to cut
Taiwan's textile quotas by twenty-five percent, equivalent to a loss of
$200 million. But Taiwan delegates, whether from private enterprises
or from the ROC government, cannot negotiate directly with the
EEC's Textile Commission because the EEC does not recognize the
ROC as a state in the international community. The situation is vividly
described in a recent study:
[T]he lack of government-to-government ties with the EEC nations is
a major handicap for the Republic of China .... Authorities from
both South Korea and Hong Kong are able to engage in direct
negotiations with the EEC Textile Commission, and thus are able to
secure more favorable-or at least less unfavorable -terms than those
that the EEC unilaterally determines for Taiwan.
Furthermore, the two governments are allowed to issue export
licenses themselves or through textile associations, and can in their
way ensure that the quota is completely used. Taiwan, on the other
hand, must rely on the import licenses issued by most of the EEC
countries (excepting West Germany and Italy).
The result is that the quota assigned to Taiwan is not always
completely utilized. Importers often decide not to use all their
allowance for Taiwan, and their allotment cannot be transferred....
Both Hong Kong and South Korea are also permitted to car-
ryover up to 6 per cent of their quotas into the following year if they
are not fully utilized, or carryforward (borrow) up to 5 percent of the
following year's allotments if a certain category of quota is in strong
demand. Neither privilege is currently enjoyed by Taiwan.77
'7 Engbarth, US $200 M at Stake, Bid for New Talks to Reduce EEC Slash on
Textile Quotas, Economic News Overseas Weekly, Feb. 4, 1978, at 33. For a thorough
analysis of the economic impact of normalization on the economy of the ROC, see Wu
& Yen, Economic Impact of Alternative US-ROC Relations, 3 INT'L TRADE L. J. 130
(1977).
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The impact of United States recognition of the PRC and the
refusal to maintain official relations with the ROC on nuclear develop-
ment in Taiwan is an issue which cannot be ignored. Taiwan has the
technical capability for building nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
At present, the ROC is a contracting party to the 1963 Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty78 and the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons.7 9 It also has concluded an agreement with the United States
on cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy.8 0 United States
refusal to recognize the ROC as a legal government of Taiwan would
result in making the ROC a non-state and would give it a legal excuse
to ignore its obligations under these treaties. Taiwan would therefore
be legally free to manufacture nuclear weapons.
Although the United States would have no sound legal basis to pre-
vent Taiwan from manufacturing nuclear weapons, it would continue
to possess great economic and political leverage to force Taiwan into
line. This is especially true since the United States would for a time re-
main Taiwan's sole source of nuclear fuel. But a knowledgeable com-
mentator has observed:
There are potential alternative sources of nuclear fuel and it is quite
possible that, having facilitated Taiwan's extraordinary success and
then having, in effect, thrown Taiwan completely back on it own
resources, the United States would prove unwilling to take military or
severe economic action against a Taiwanese government which refused
to allow continued inspection of its nuclear reactors and develop-
ment. Such action would be morally questionable and politically
dangerous, and would shock other United States allies. The legality
of such actions would be dubious and the pressure from Taiwan's
political supporters and foreign investors would be intense.8 1
In order to reduce the adverse effect of United States de-
recognition of the ROC, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 specifically
guarantees the legal status of Taiwan in the United States domestic law
and in fact virtually treats it as a state:
18 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, entered into force Oct. 10, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313,
T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
19 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature
July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
80 Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Republic of China Concerning Civil Uses of
Atomic Energy, entered into force June 22, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 945, T.I.A.S. No. 7364, as
amended 25 U.S.T. 913, T.I.A.S. No. 7834.
"' Overholt, Nuclear Proliferation in Eastern Asia, 8 PAC. COMMUNITY ASIAN Q.
REV. 50 (1976).
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(b) . .. .
(1) Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to
foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities,
such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to
Taiwan.
(3)(A) The absence of diplomatic relations and recognition
with respect to Taiwan shall not abrogate, infringe, modify, deny, or
otherwise affect in any way rights or obligations (including but not
limited to those involving contracts, debts, or property interests of
any kind) under the laws of the United States heretofore or hereafter
acquired by or with respect to Taiwan.
(7) The capacity of Taiwan to sue and be sued in courts in the
United States, in accordance with the laws of the United States, shall
not be abrogated, infringed, modified, denied, or otherwise affected
in any way by the absence of diplomatic relations or recognition.
(8) No requirement, whether expressed or implied, under the
laws of the United States with respect to maintenance of diplomatic
relations or recognition shall be applicable with respect to Taiwan.
(c) For all purposes, including actions in any court in the United
States, the Congress approves the continuation in force of all treaties
and other international agreements, including multilateral conven-
tions, entered into by the United States and the governing authorities
on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China
prior to January 1, 1979, and in force between them on December
31, 1978, unless and until terminated in accordance with law.
(d) Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for support-
ing the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued member-
ship in any international financial institution or any other interna-
tional organization.82
VII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Recent United States recognition of the PRC on the latter's terms
has created many legal problems, domestic and international, regard-
ing continued United States relations with Taiwan, particularly
Taiwan's future security. President Carter's statement on "hav[ing] an
interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue" and
"expect[ing] that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the
Chinese themselves," has no legal meaning at all. Such "interest" or
82 Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-8, § 4, 93 Stat. 14 (1979) (to
be codified in 22 U.S.C. § 3303).
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"expectation" cannot change the nature of the Taiwan problem, which
was referred to in the Chinese statement issued at the same time and
not challenged by the United States, as an internal Chinese affair.
Under such circumstances, any future United States relations with
Taiwan can exist only so long as Peking tolerates them. If Peking were
to interfere with such relations, the United States would be in a very
poor legal position to challenge such interference. Therefore, it is
essential that the United States make it clear to Peking that it does not
recognize Peking's claim to Taiwan and will tolerate no interference in
its relations with Taiwan, whether commercial, cultural, scientific,
technological, defensive, or otherwise.
Past experience from dealing with Peking teaches one to make
everything explicit and unmistakably clear. Also, one cannot trust the
so-called "goodwill" of Peking. In 1954, the PRC concluded an agree-
ment with India on trade and intercourse between India and Tibet"
and concurrently issued a joint communiqu6 on peaceful co-
existence. 84 When Prime Minister Nehru raised the Sino-Indian bound-
ary question, Premier Chou En-lai assured Nehru that this would not
be an obstacle to friendly relations between the two countries. But
after the PRC consolidated its control in Tibet, 85 it settled its bound-
ary question with India by resorting to the use of force. On September
10, 1955, the United States and PRC reached an Agreed Announce-
ment on Repatriation of Civilians, 86 in which the PRC "recognize[d]
that Americans in the PRC who desire[d] to return to the United
States [were] entitled to do so." When the time came to implement the
agreement, the PRC insisted that only those Americans who were not
in Chinese prisons would be allowed to go home. It also demanded
that the United States provide a list of all Chinese in this country in
exchange for a comparable list to be provided by Peking of all
Americans in mainland China. At the time there were fewer than 100
Americans in China, while over 200,000 Chinese resided in the United
States. Most of these Chinese were overwhelmingly pro-Republic of
" Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibetan Region of China and
India, People's Republic of China-India, Apr. 29, 1954, 299 U.N.T.S. 59.
84 For the text of the communique, see 1 J. COHEN & H. CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY 120 (1974).
's The PRC established its control over Tibet by eliminating about five percent
of the population. See INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, THE QUESTION OF TIBET AND THE
RULE OF LAW (1959); INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, TIBET AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC (1960).
88 33 DEP'T STATE BULL. 456 (1955).
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China (Taiwan) and were almost universally opposed to the releasing
of their names to the PRC, for fear that their relatives in mainland
China would be subjected to communist pressure. 87 There is no reason
why this manipulation in implementing an agreement will not be
repeated in the future if the United States does not make its position
on future United States-Taiwan relations clear and unambiguous to
the PRC.
In view of the foregoing analysis, it is understandable why the Con-
gress has insisted that it should take certain credible measures to assure
the security of Taiwan and the continuation of the close economic,
cultural and other relations between the two countries so as to make
United States policy toward Taiwan clear to the PRC. This was done
by passing the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 by an overwhelming ma-
jority of both the House and the Senate in late March 1979.
Since law cannot be totally divorced from political reality, it is
essential that United States recognition of the PRC reflect the reality of
the Chinese situation. Today, there are in fact two Chinese govern-
ments, each controlling a large territory and each governing effectively
within the area of its respective control. In recognizing the PRC, the
United States should not ignore the existence of the ROC on Taiwan
and its seventeen million people-a country with a viable economy
whose volume of trade makes it the sixteenth largest trading country in
the community of nations and the eighth largest trading partner of the
United States. There is no legal or moral ground on which the United
States can reasonably ignore the ROC as a state in the international
community. It is therefore not for the PRC to insist on United States
de-recognition of and maintenance of only unofficial relations with the
ROC as a condition for accepting United States recognition. The
Soviet Union has not insisted on United States de-recognition of the
three Baltic states (Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia) as a condition for
continuing diplomatic relations with the United States. There is no
reason why, in the Chinese case, the United States should act different-
ly.
Finally, the human rights aspect of United States recognition of the
PRC should not be ignored. The ROC, with its seventeen million peo-
ple rightfully demands a respectful place in the world community of
nations and the right to maintain its present prosperous economy. If
87 H. CHIU, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF TREATIES 82-84
(1972), and references cited.
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United States recognition of the PRC would result in jeopardizing the
welfare and aspirations of the ROC and its citizens, it would be con-
trary to the principles of international law, justice and respect for
human rights and self-determination- all principles that this great
democracy has cherished since its founding over two hundred years
ago.

